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Express Federal Preemption Provisions, State Law Actions
for Damages, Congress, and the Supreme Court: A Penitent
Seeks Redemption
David E. Seidelson"
When my grandfather was on his deathbed, he held out his big blacksmith's
hand to me and said, "Doodel." He was the only one who ever called me
Doodel. I placed my hand under his and said, "I'm here, Zayde." He said,
"Doodel, I want you to promise me something." I said, "Anything, Zayde." He
said, "First, never play cards with a stranger named Doc. Second, never get into
a barroom fight with anybody named Monk. And, third, never read a Supreme
Court decision dealing with federal preemption." I managed to keep only two
of those three promises, so now I write as a penitent seeking at least partial
redemption by attempting to resolve an enigma, and thus avoid becoming a
piacular offering.' I've never played cards with a stranger named Doc and, so
far as I know, I never had a barroom fight with anyone named Monk. But, oh,
those Supreme Court opinions on federal preemption ....
Let's focus on a particular kind of preemption problem, one in which the
federal statute contains an express preemption provision, and the issue is whether
Copyright 1997, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
Lyle T. Alverson Professor of Law, George Washington University.
I. I stand doubly in need of redemption. First, of course, because of the broken promise.
Beyond that, I am a first-born son, hence; devoted to God until redeemed.
Under the law, in memory of the Exodus (when the first-born of the Egyptians were
slain), the eldest son was regarded as devoted to God, and was in every case to be
redeemed by an offering not exceeding five shekels, within one month from birth.
F.N. Peloubet, Peloubet's Bible Dictionary 198 (1925).
[A]nd all the firstborn of man among thy children shalt thou redeem.
Exodus 14:13 (King James).
[r]he 'firstborn of thy sons shalt thou give unto me.
Exodus 22:29 (King James).
For all the firstborn of the children of Israel are mine, both man and beast: on the day
that I smote every firstborn in the land of Egypt I sanctified them for myself.
Numbers 8:17 (King James).
Every thing that openeth the matrix in all flesh, which they bring unto the Lord, whether
it be of men or beasts, shall be thine: nevertheless the firstborn of man shalt thou surely
redeem, and the firstling of unclean beasts shalt thou redeem.
Numbers 18:15 (King James).
And those that are to be redeemed from a month old shalt thou redeem, according to thine
estimation, for the money of five shekels, after the shekel of the sanctuary, which is
twenty gerahs.
Numbers 18:16 (King James).
And if it be from a month old even unto five years old, then thy estimation shall be of
the male five shekels of silver, and for the female thy estimation shall be three shekels
of silver.
Leviticus 27:6 (King James).
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that provision preempts state common law actions for damages. That sounds
simple enough; it should create no enigma to apply an express preemption
provision to a specific cause of action. But, remember, we're dealing with
Congress and the Supreme Court. Let's direct our attention primarily to three
relatively recent Supreme Court opinions: Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,2
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,3 and Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick.4
In Cipollone, Rose Cipollone and her husband brought a diversity action
against three tobacco companies,s alleging that Mrs. Cipollone had suffered lung
cancer as the result of smoking cigarettes manufactured and marketed by the
defendants. Upon Mrs. Cipollone's death, her husband filed an amended
complaint. Upon his death (after trial), Thomas Cipollone, son of the original
plaintiffs and executor of both estates, prosecuted the action.
The final amended complaint asserted "several different bases of recovery,
relying on theories of strict liability, negligence, express warranty, and intentional
tort."1
6
These claims, all based on New Jersey law, divide into five categories.
The "design defect claims" allege that [Defendants'] cigarettes were
defective because [Defendants] failed to use a safer alternative design
for their products and because the social value of their product was
outweighed by the dangers it created .... The "failure to warn claims"
allege both that the product was "defective as a result of [Defendants']
failure to provide adequate warnings of the health consequences of
cigarette smoking" ... and that [Defendants] "were negligent in the
manner [in which] they tested, researched, sold, promoted, and
advertised" their cigarettes .... The "express warranty claims" allege
that [Defendants] had "expressly warranted that smoking the cigarettes
which they manufactured and sold did not present any significant health
consequences".... The "fraudulent misrepresentation claims" allege
that [Defendants] had wilfully "through their advertising, attempted to
neutralize the [federally mandated] warnin[g]" labels ... and that they
had possessed, but had "ignored and failed to act upon" medical and
scientific data indicating that "cigarettes were hazardous to the health
of consumers" ..... Finally, the "conspiracy to defraud claims" allege
that [Defendants] conspired to deprive the public of such medical and
scientific data ....
2. 505 U.S. 504, 112 S. CL 2608 (1992).
3. 116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996).
4. 115 S. Ct. 1483 (1995).
5. Liggett Group, Inc., Philip Morris, Inc., and Lorillard, Inc. in Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
Inc., 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990).
6. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 509, 112 S. Ct. at 2614.
7. ld. at 509-10, 112 S. Ct. at 2614.
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The defendants asserted that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising
Act,' enacted in 1965, and the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969"
preempted all state law theories of action based on the defendants' conduct after
1965. More specifically, the defendants relied on their compliance with the
warnings mandated in the two Acts and the preemption provisions of those Acts.
The "preemption"' section of the 1965 Act provided that:
(a) No statement related to smoking and health, other than the
statement required by ... this Act, shall be required on any cigarette
package.
(b) No statement related to smoking and health shall be required in the
advertising of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in
conformity with the provisions of this Act."
The preemption provision of the 1969 Act is as follows:
(b) No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall
be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion
of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with
the provisions of this Act. 2
It was the defendants' position that in light of the declaration of the Acts' two
purposes--"(l) the public may be adequately informed that cigarette smoking
may be hazardous to health by inclusion of a warning to that effect on each
package of cigarettes; and (2) commerce and the national economy may be (A)
protected to the maximum extent consistent with this policy and (B) not impeded
by diverse, nonuniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and advertising
regulations with respect to any relationship between smoking and
health"' 3-and the defendants' compliance with the mandated warnings, the
preemption sections immunized the defendants from liability under all of the
theories asserted, with regard to the defendants' post-1965 conduct.
The federal district court wasn't having any.'4 It concluded that the sole
purpose of the preemption sections was to establish a uniform national warning
that would shield cigarette manufacturers from potentially divergent state
requirements; the Acts were not intended to preempt any common law actions."3
Consequently, the district court granted the plaintiffs' motion to strike the
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1982), Pub. L. 89-92, §§ 2-11, July 27, 1965, 79 Stat. 282,
amended by 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1994).
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1994).
10. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 514, 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2616 (1992).
II. Id.
12. Id. at 515, 112 S. Ct. at 2617; 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1994).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).
14. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1146 (D.N.J. 1984).
15. Id. at 1166, 1170.
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preemption defense.' 6 However, on interlocutory appeal, the Third Circuit
found that the Acts impliedly preempted "those state law damage actions relating
to smoking and health that challenge either the adequacy of the warning on
cigarette packages or the propriety of a party's actions with respect to the
advertising and promotion of cigarettes.' 7  The Third Circuit "did not ...
identify the specific claims asserted .. that were pre-empted by the Act."'"
After the Supreme Court denied a petition for certiorari,"9 the case was returned
to the district court for trial."0
Complying with the Court of Appeals mandate, the District Court held
that the failure to warn, express warranty, fraudulent misrepresentation,
and conspiracy to defraud claims were barred to the extent that they
reliedon the [Defendants'] advertising, promotional, and public relations
activities after January 1, 1966 (the effective date of the 1965 Act).2'
At trial, the jury awarded $400,000 to Rose Cipollone's husband based on one
of the defendant's breach of its duty to warn and its express warranties before
1966.22 Finding, however, that Rose Cipollone had assumed the risk of
smoking cigarettes and that 80% of the responsibility for her injuries was
attributable to her, the jury awarded no damages to her estate. 2 On cross-
appeals, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's preemption rulings,2'
although remanding for a new trial on other grounds." Then the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to review the preemption issues. 6
Justice Stevens wrote what was in part a majority opinion and in part a
plurality opinion. 7 The majority opinion concluded that "the 1965 Act only
preempted state and federal rulemaking bodies from mandating particular
cautionary statements and did not pre-empt state law damages actions."" The
16. Id. at 1170-71.
17. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 1986).
18. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 512, 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2615 (1992).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 512, 112 S. Ct. at 2615.
24. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 583 (3d Cir. 1990).
25. Id.
26. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 512, 112 S. Ct. at 2615.
27. Partsl, id. atSO9,112S. CLat2614;ll, id. at513,112S. Ct. at2615;I11, id. atSI6,112
S. Ct. at 2617; and IV, id. at 518, 112 S. Ct. at 2618, constitute the majority opinion. Parts V, id.
at 520, 112 S. Ct. at 2619 and VI, id. at 530, 112 S. Ct. at 2625, constitute the plurality opinion.
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and O'Connor joined in the plurality opinion. Justice
Stevens' majority opinion contains an extensive history of the investigations into "a link between
smoking and illness," the congressional and administrative reactions to that investigation, and the
contexts within which the 1965 and 1969 Acts were enacted. Id. at 513-20, 112 S. CL at 2615-19.
28. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 519-20, 112 S. CL 2608, 2619 (1992)
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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plurality opinion concluded that the 1969 Act did preempt certain state common
law actions. More precisely, that opinion found that the latter Act preempted
failure-to-warn damage actions based on the defendants' post-1969 advertising
or promotions.29 The plurality opinion concluded that the 1969 Act did not
preempt state law damage actions based on breach of express warranty,
fraudulent misrepresentation, and conspiracy to misrepresent or conceal material
facts.30
Why the basic difference between Justice Stevens' majority and plurality
opinions that, while the 1965 Act preempted no state law damage actions, the
1969 Act was intended to preempt some, and in this particular case, one such
common law action? Quite properly, Justice Stevens predicated both opinions
on the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution:3' "Laws of the United States...
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding."'" Then, again quite properly, Justice Stevens
emphasized the restraint to be exercised by courts in applying the Supremacy
Clause: "[T]he historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by
... Federal Act unless that is the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.""
That congressional intent "may be 'explicitly stated in the statute's language or
implicitly contained in its structure and purpose." 34 Such an implicit intent is
to be inferred only if the state law "actually conflicts with federal law ... or if
the federal law so thoroughly occupies a legislative field 'as to make reasonable
the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.'"4
Given the preemption provisions of both the 1965 and 1969 Acts, Justice Stevens
concluded that their "pre-emptive scope .. is governed entirely by the express
language in § 5 of each Act."'3 6
The plurality opinion found the "plain language"07 of the 1969 Act's
preemption provision to be "much broader ' 3 than that of the 1965 Act: "First,
the later Act bars not simply 'statements' but rather 'requirements or prohibi-
tion[s] ... imposed under State law.' Second, the later Act reaches beyond
statements 'in the advertising' to obligations 'with respect to the advertising or
29. Id. at 530-31, 112 S. Ct. at 2625.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 516, 112 S. Ct. at 2617.
32. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
33. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516, 112 S. Ct at 2617 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S. CL 1146, 1152 (1947) (emphasis added)).
34. Id. at 516, 112 S. CL at 2617 (quoting Jones v. Roth Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525, 97
S. Ct. 1305, 1309 (1977)).
35. Id. at 516, 112 S. Ct. at 2617 (quoting Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources
Conservation and Dcv. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 204, 103 S. Ct. 1713, 1722 (1983) and Fidelity Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153, 102 S. Ct. 3014, 3022 (1982)).
36. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517, 112 S. Ct. at 2618 (emphasis added).
37. Id. at 520, 112 S. Ct at 2619.
38. Id.
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promotion' of cigarettes."39 It's obvious, of course, that a preemption that is
expressly applicable to "advertising or promotion" is broader than one applicable
only to "advertising." But it hardly follows as a matter of course that the
broader preemption applies to damage actions based on inadequate warnings.
Presumably, inadequate warnings could occur in advertising alone, or in
promotions alone, or in both. The fact that both are covered by the 1969 Act
does not require or even imply the conclusion that that Act preempts actions
seeking money damages on the basis of inadequate warnings. It is at least as
likely that the 1969 Act was simply intended to preclude rulemaking applicable
to advertising or promotion inconsistent with the rules fashioned by Congress.
Does the distinction between "statements"4 (the 1965 Act) and "require-
ments or prohibition[s]"" (the 1969 Act) justify the difference in preemptive
effect discerned by the plurality opinion? It seems that, if anything, the latter
language more clearly suggests rule-making (and not damage actions) than the
former. But the plurality concluded that state law actions for damages could
have the effect of requiring certain conduct or prohibiting certain conduct. Still,
it seems equally likely that state law actions could require or prohibit certain
"statements." Where the language makes no express reference to such damage
actions, and "the pre-emptive scope"' 2 of both Acts is to be "governed entirely
by the express language"' 3 of their preemptive provisions, the more appropriate
conclusion would be that Congress did not intend to preempt actions for
damages.
The majority opinion compared the different contexts in which the 1965 and
1969 Acts were fashioned. Prior to enactment of the 1965 Act, the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) and several states were moving toward regulation of
cigarette labeling and advertising."' Prior to the enactment of the 1969 Act, the
FTC was considering "a proposed rule which would ban the broadcast of
cigarette commercials by radio and television stations"4 s as well as a warning
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517, 112 S. Ct. at 2618.
43. Id. The plurality's conclusion that state law actions for compensatory damages could have
the effect of requiring or prohibiting certain conduct seems at odds with the conclusion achieved in
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 104 S. Ct. 615 (1984). There, the Court:
reject[ed] Kerr-McGee's submission that the punitive damages award in this case conflicts
with Congress' express intent to preclude dual regulation of radiation hazards....
Congress did not believe that it was inconsistent to vest the NRC with exclusive
regulatory authority over the safety aspects of nuclear development while at the same time
allowing plaintiffs like Mr. Silkwood to recover for injuries caused by nuclear hazards.
Id. at 257-58, 104 S. Ct. at 626 (emphasis added). If punitive damages, traditionally viewed as a
means of deterring undesirable conduct, do not constitute regulation, it would seem that the award
of compensatory damages should not be equated with prohibiting certain conduct for preemption
purposes. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 538 n.4, 112 S. CL at 2628-29 (Justice Blackmun's opinion).
44. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 513, 112 S. Ct. at 2616.
45. Id. at 515. 112 S. Ct. at 2616.
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requirement for cigarette advertising." "State authorities also proposed to take
actions regulating cigarette advertisements.""7 Do those differing contexts
justify the plurality conclusion that the 1969 Act preempted damage actions
based on inadequate warnings? I think not, for a couple of reasons. First, the
two contexts don't seem to be dramatically different, certainly not different
enough to explain the dramatically different preemptive effect attributed to the
1969 Act by the plurality. Second, it was the majority that concluded that "the
pre-emptive scope... of the 1965 Act and the 1969 Act is governed entirely by
the express language of each Act."" In light of that language of the majority,
it would be inordinately awkward if the plurality's conclusion as to the
preemptive effect of the 1969 Act were influenced in any way by the contexts
in which the two acts were enacted, especially since the majority and plurality
opinions were authored by the same Justice.
Justice Blackmun wrote a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting
in part. The gist of his conclusion is set forth in this language:
I... find the Court's divided holding [presumably that of the majority
and that of the plurality] with respect to the original and amended
versions of the federal statute entirely unsatisfactory. Our precedents
do not allow us to infer a scope of pre-emption beyond that which is
mandated by Congress' language. In my view, neither version of the
federal legislation at issue here provides the kind of unambiguous
evidence of congressional intent necessary to displace state common-law
damages claims. 9
Justice Blackmun found the plurality's dramatically different readings of
"statement" 0 in the 1965 Act and "requirement or prohibition"5' in the 1969
Act inappropriate since Congress' preclusion went to requirements or prohibitions
"imposed under""2 state law, thus suggesting state rule-making rather than state
damage actions. Beyond such "specifics,""3 Justice Blackmun was "further
disturbed"' by the "crazy quilt of pre-emption from among the common law
claims implicated in [the] case"" fashioned by the plurality. Of the various
damage actions asserted, only that based on inadequate warning was found
46. Id.
47. Id. (footnote omitted).
48. Id. at 517, 1!2 S. Ct. at 2618.
49. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 531, 112 S. Ct. at 2625. Justice Kennedy and Justice Souter joined
in Justice Blackmun's opinion.
50. Id. at 535, 112 S. Ct. at 2627.
51. Id.
52. Id,
53. Id. at 542. 112 S. Ct. at 263 1.
54. Cipoilone, 505 U.S. at 542, 112 S. Ct. at 2631.
55. Id. at 542-43, 112 S. CL at 2631.
19971
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preempted as a consequence of the 1969 Act by the plurality;56 damage actions
based on express warranty, fraudulent misrepresentation, and conspiracy to
misrepresent or conceal material facts were deemed by the plurality to be not
preempted." Justice Blackmun could not "believe that Congress intended to
create such a hodge-podge of allowed and disallowed claims when it amended
the pre-emption provision.""8 In addition to disbelieving that Congress had
intended to fashion "such a hodge-podge,"59 Justice Blackmun could "only
speculate as to the difficulty lower courts will encounter in attempting to
implement the Court's decision.""
Justice Scalia wrote a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in
part. He concluded that, "[a]pplying ordinary principles of statutory construction,
... [plaintiff s] failure-to-wam claims are pre-empted by the 1965 Act, and all
his common-law claims by the 1969 Act."6' Justice Scalia's conclusion was a
product of his view that there was no merit in the majority's "principle of
statutory construction"62 that express federal preemption provisions should be
construed narrowly "in light of the presumption against the pre-emption of state
police power regulations."63 On the contrary, Justice Scalia believed that,
"[w]hen [the ordinary meaning of a pre-emption provision] suggests that [it] was
intended to sweep broadly, our construction must sweep broadly as well."" It
was his determination that the preemption language before the Court was so
intended that led to his broad sweep of statutory construction. Like Justice
Blackmun, who found none of the common law actions preempted by either of
the two Acts, Justice Scalia believed that the majority and plurality opinions
resulted in a combination of conclusions beyond rational comprehension. He
wrote, "[the] ... questions raised by today's decision will fill the law-books for
years to come. A disposition that raises more questions than it answers does not
serve the country well.""5
As among the four opinions in Cipollone (majority, plurality, Justice
Blackmun's and Justice Scalia's), I find Justice Blackmun's the most appropriate.
I believe it is his opinion that achieves the most credible reading of the
preemption provisions before the Court and is best calculated to achieve the least
confusing authority for courts and litigants to follow. That diminution of
confusion is no minor matter, as Cippolone clearly, even painfully, demonstrates.
The district court found that none of the state common law actions were
56. Id. at 530-31, 112 S. Ct. at 2625.
57. Id. at 531, 112 S. Ct. at 2625.
58. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 543, 112 S. Ct. at 2631.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 543-44, 112 S. CL at 2631.
61. Id. at 548; 112 S. CL at 2634. Justice Tho mas joined in Justice Scalia's opinion.
62. Cipoilone, 505 U.S. at 544, 112 S. Ct. at 2632.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 548, 112 S. Ct at 2634.
65. Id. at 556, 112 S. Ct. at 2638.
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preempted." The Third Circuit concluded that some were and some were
not. And the majority opinion of the Supreme Court found that none of the
state actions were precluded by the 1965 Act,6" thereby reversing in part and
affirming in part. The plurality opinion concluded that the 1969 Act preempted
the failure-to-warn claims;69 the Court was incapable of fashioning a majority
opinion with regard to the 1969 Act. One separate opinion found that none of
the state claims was preempted by either Act70 and another separate opinion
concluded that together the two Acts preempted all of the state law actions.7
To me, all of that suggests two things: (1) there must be something very wrong
with the work of Congress in drafting the preemption provisions; and (2) there
must be something equally wrong with the Court's construction of preemption
provisions in failing to deter Congress from such faulty draftsmanship and in
failing to provide clear guidance to courts and litigants in such basic questions
as whether or not, or to what extent, express preemption provisions preempt state
law actions for money damages. Is the problem-or problems-unique to
Cipollone or endemic to the issue?
Let's examine Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr.7" Mrs. Lohr, having been implanted
with a Medtronic cardiac pacemaker, suffered severe injuries allegedly resulting
ftom a defect in the pacemaker's lead. Plaintiffs, Mrs. Lohr and her husband,
sued defendant, Medtronic, in a Florida state court." Medtronic removed the
case to a federal district court on diversity grounds.74 The plaintiffs' complaint
asserted a negligence and a strict liability count pursuant to Florida law."
The negligence count alleged a breach of Medtronic's "duty to use
reasonable care in the design, manufacture, assembly, and sale of the
subject pacemaker" in several respects, including the use of defective
materials in the lead and a failure to warn or properly instruct the
plaintiff or her physicians of the tendency of the pacemaker to fail,
despite knowledge of other earlier failures .... The strict liability
count alleged that the device was in a defective condition and unreason-
ably dangerous to foreseeable users at the time of its sale.76
66. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1146 (D.NJ. 1984).
67. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986).
68. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 519-20, 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2619 (1992).
69. Id. at 530-31, 112 S. Ct. at 2625.
70. Id. at 544, 112 S. Ct. at 2631-32.
71. Id. at 548, 112 S. Ct. at 2634.
72. 116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996). Justice Stevens' majority opinion contains an extensive history
of the Medical Device Amendments Act (MDA), the divisions of Class I, Class II, and Class III
devices, premarket approval (PMA) of Class II devices, and substantially equivalent Class Ill claims
which may be marketed without PMA. Id. at 2245-48.
73. Id. at 2248.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
19971
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Medtronic moved for summary judgment based on the assertion that the
negligence and strict liability claims were preempted by section 360k(a) of the
Medical Devices Amendments (MDA) which states:"
State and local requirements respecting devices
(A) General rule
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no State or
political subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect with
respect to a device intended for human use any requirement-
(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement
applicable under this chapter to the device, and
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to
any other matter included in a requirement applicable to the device
under this chapter.7"
Influenced by an Eleventh Circuit opinion," the district court dismissed the
Lohrs' complaint."0 The Eleventh Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part,
finding that the plaintiffs' negligent design claims were not preempted but that
the negligent manufacturing and failure-to-warn claims were preempted."' "The
Court made a parallel disposition of the strict liability claims, holding that there
was no pre-emption insofar as plaintiffs alleged an unreasonably dangerous
design, but they could not revive the negligent manufacturing or failure to warn
claim under a strict liability theory." 2 Medtronic sought certiorari as to those
portions of the Eleventh Circuit's decision negating preemption and the Lohrs
sought certiorari with regard to those portions of the decision upholding
preemption."3 "Because the Courts of Appeals [were] divided over the extent
to which state common-law claims [were] pre-empted by the MDA,"s4 the
Supreme Court granted both sides' petitions. s
Once again, Justice Stevens wrote what was in part a majority opinion and
in part a plurality opinion." The majority opinion concluded that the MDA did
not preempt any of the common law claims asserted." The plurality opinion
77. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1994). Subsection (b) of Section 360k, setting forth the methods
available to a state or political subdivision thereof for securing an exemption, was not applicable to
the case. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2249 n.5 (1996).
78. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1994).
79. Duncan v. Iolab Corp., 12 F.3d 194 (11 th Cir. 1994).
80. Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2249.
81. Id. and 56 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 1995).
82. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2249-50 (1996).
83. Id. at 2250.
84. Id.
85. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 806 (1996).
86. The majority portions of the opinion consist of parts 1, Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct.
2240, 2245 (1996); 11, id. at 2248; 111, Id. at 2250; V, id. at 2253; and VII, id. at 2259. The plurality
portions are IV, Id. at 2251 and VI, id. at 2258.
87. Id. at 2259.
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found that § 360k could preempt certain common law actions but declined to
identify such claims since no such claim had been asserted by the plaintiffs and
the Court "need not resolve hypothetical cases that may arise in the future." 8
The majority noted that, "[als in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., . . . we are
presented with the task of interpreting a statutory provision that expressly pre-
empts state law."89 Yet, in that same paragraph, the majority stated, "[O]ur
interpretation of that language does not occur in a contextual vacuum."" The
majority found, rather, "that interpretation is informed by two presumptions
about the nature of pre-emption."
91
First, because the States are independent sovereigns in our federal
system, we have long presumed that Congress does not cavalierly pre-
empt state-law causes of action.
Second, our analysis of the scope of the statute's pre-emption is
guided by our oft-repeated comment ... that "[the purpose of Congress
is the ultimate touchstone" in every pre-emption case."
The first "presumption" (as in Cipollone) is entirely appropriate. It says that
an express provision preempting state law should be read no more broadly than
the express language requires. To the extent that that admonition may be
somewhat redundant, its redundancy at least errs on the safe side. The second
"presumption," no matter how often repeated, is, I believe, inappropriate. If "the
purpose of Congress"93 is discerned from something other than the express
preemption language, the court is likely to read that language either too broadly
or too narrowly, with the former alternative being the more likely, given the
propriety of the first presumption. An express preemption provision inherently
states Congress' purpose. To go beyond the express language is to substitute
judicial preference for the decision of Congress. Indeed, the majority opinion
itself states that:
Congress' intent, of course, primarily is discerned from the language of
the preemption statute and the "statutory framework" surrounding it....
Also relevant, however, is the "structure and purpose of the statute as
a whole," . . as revealed not only in the text, but through the
reviewing court's reasoned understanding of the way in which Congress
88. Id.
89. Id. at 2250.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. (quoting Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103, 84 S. Ct. 219,
222 (1963)).
93. Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2250.
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intended the statute and its surrounding regulatory scheme to affect
business, consumers, and the law."
Express preemption my foot; that's judicial preference.
Justice Breyer wrote a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in
part and concurring in the judgment. In his view, "[this] case raises two
questions. First, do the Medical Device Amendments (MDA) to the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetics Act ever pre-empt a state law tort action? Second, if so, does the
MDA pre-empt the particular state law tort claims at issue here?"" He
answered the first question, "yes"" and the second, "no."97
Why yes to the first? Because, in Justice Breyer's view, "[o]ne can
reasonably read the word "requirement" as including the legal requirements that
grow out of the application, in particular circumstances, of a State's tort law.""
In other words, damage awards may result in a "requirement" as effectively as
rule-making. But the statutory language is directed toward "State and local
requirements"99 and precludes a "State or political subdivision"'" thereof
from "establish[ing] or continu[ing] in effect.., any requirement"'0 ' inconsis-
tent with the chapter and "relate[d] to the safety or effectiveness of the device
or to any other matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under
this chapter."" 2 When was the last time you heard of a political subdivision
of a state awarding damages in a tort action or creating any common law cause
of action awarding such damages?'03 I am inclined rather strongly toward the
view that the word "requirement" cannot reasonably be read as including state
actions for money damages.
Why no to the second question? Because, in Justice Breyer's view, the
answer to that question "turns on Congress' intent.""° I would have thought
it more appropriate to say that it turned on Congress' intent as manifested in the
express preemption provision. Why didn't Justice Breyer? I guess, in part,
because he found "the MDA's pre-emption provision ... highly ambiguous."'05
94. Id. at 2250-51 (quoting Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88,
98, I1I, 112 S. Ct. 2374, 2383, 2389-90 (1992)).
95. Medtronlc, 116 S. Ct. at 2259.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 2260.
98. Id. at 2259. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee, 464 U.S. 238, 104 S. Ct. 615 (1984), and supra
note 43.
99. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (Supp. 1997).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(aX2) (Supp. 1997).
103. It's true, of course, that state trial courts are geographically divided by counties, but the
common law applied by all of those courts is state common law as fashioned by the state appellate
courts.
104. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2260 (1996).
105. Id.
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Because of that ambiguity, Justice Breyer concluded that: "Congress must have
intended that courts look elsewhere for help as to just which federal requirements
pre-empt just which state requirements, as well as just how they might do
SO."" That strikes me as being a strange way to go about applying an express
preemption provision; indeed, a way far more likely to reveal judicial preference
than congressional intent. I would think it more appropriate to say that any state
law not clearly preempted by an express preemption provision just ain't
preempted. Perhaps not surprisingly, Justice Breyer's approach led him into
"conflict" 7 and "field"'08 preemption. That would seem to be the "logical"
extension of determining Congress' intent from the express preemptive provision.
Happily though, Justice Breyer could "find no actual conflict between any federal
requirement and any of the liability-creating premises of the plaintiffs' state law
tort suit; nor... [could he find] that either Congress or the FDA intended the
relevant FDA regulations to occupy entirely any relevant field."'"
Justice O'Connor, too, wrote a separate opinion, concurring in part and
dissenting in part." 0 Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority opinion that,
"because Congress has expressly provided a pre-emption provision, we need not
go beyond that language to determine whether Congress intended the MDA to
pre-empt state law.... We agree, then, on the task before us: to interpret
Congress' intent by reading the statute in accordance with its terms.'.
However, unlike the majority, Justice O'Connor concluded that "state common-
law damages actions do impose 'requirements' and are therefore pre-empted
where such requirements would differ from those imposed by the FDCA. ' ' 2
That conclusion and her concomitant finding that the statutory language does not
indicate that a "requirement" must be "specific," either to pre-empt or be pre-
empted, led Justice O'Connor to conclude that a state common-law claim is pre-
empted if it would impose "any requirement" "which is different from, or in
addition to," any requirement applicable to the device under the FDCA."'
Thus, Justice O'Connor found preempted the plaintiffs' "manufacture and failure
to warn claims."" 4
So, once again, as in Cipollone, the question of whether an express federal
preemption provision served to preempt state law actions for damages generated
four opinions: the majority opinion, the plurality opinion, Justice Breyer's
opinion, and Justice O'Connor's opinion. And en route to the Supreme Court,
106. Id.
107. Id. at 2261.
108. Id.
109. Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2261.
110. Id. at 2262. Justice O'Connor's opinion was joined in by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice
Scalia, and Justice Thomas.
111. Id.
112. Id. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 104 S. Ct. 615 (1984) and supra
notes 43 and 98.
113. Medtronlc, i16 S. Ct at2264.
114. Id. at 2264.
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the district court found all of the plaintiffs' state law actions preempted and the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. In turn, the Supreme
Court affumed in part and reversed in part. Apparently, it must still be
concluded that Congress isn't doing something right in the wording of its express
preemption provisions and, just maybe, the Members of the Court aren't doing
something right in their reading of those provisions. Lower courts and litigants
seem to lack adequate guidance. Can anything be done to remedy the situation?
After Cipollone and before Medtronic, the Court decided Freightliner Corp.
v. Myrick,"' which involved two cases that were consolidated for decision.1 6
"In both .... 18-wheel tractor-trailers attempted to brake suddenly and ended up
jackknifing into oncoming traffic. Neither vehicle was equipped with an antilock
braking system'(ABS)."".7 In one of the cases, the plaintiff, Mr. Myrick, the
driver of an oncoming vehicle was injured when the rig, manufactured by
Freightliner,"a collided with his vehicle. Plaintiff's injuries left him perma-
nently paraplegic and brain damaged. In the second case, the driver of an
oncoming car, Grace Lindsey, was killed in a collision between the rig,
manufactured by Navistar," 9 and her vehicle. Both collisions occurred in
Georgia.' Myrick brought a personal injury action against Freightliner, and
the personal representative of the estate of Lindsey brought a wrongful death
action against Navistar. Both actions were brought in Georgia state courts.',
Defendants removed both to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdic-
tion. 2  In both actions, Plaintiffs alleged "negligent design defects"' 23 pursu-
ant to Georgia common law. In both, Defendants moved for summary
judgments, asserting that the state law actions had been preempted by federal
law.
The federal law asserted by Defendants was Standard 121,"4 issued
pursuant to authority delegated by the Secretary of Transportation under the
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (NTMVSA or Safety Act). 12 5
"[Standard 121] imposed stopping distances and vehicle stability require-
ments for trucks [and tractor-trailers equipped with air brakes].' 2 6 At the
behest of "[s]everal -manufacturers and trade associations," 27 the Ninth
115. 115 S. Ct. 1483 (1995).
116. Id. at 1485.
117. Id. (footnote omitted).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Freightlfner Corp., 115 S. Ct. at 1485.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. 49 C.F.R. 571.121 S5.3.1 (1972).
125. Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 115 S. Ct. 1483, 1486 (1995); 15 U.S.C. § 1381-1426
(repealed 1994 and superseded by 49 U.S.C. § 30169 (1994)).
126. Freightliner Corp., 115 S. Ct. at 1486.
127. Id.
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Circuit' suspended Standard 121 "[u]ntil the [National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA)] compiled sufficient evidence to show that ABS
would not create the possibility of greater danger."'"9 Although NHTSA left
Standard 121 in the Code of Federal Regulations, NHTSA "to this day ... has
not taken final action to reinstate a safety standard governing the stopping
distance of trucks and trailers."'"0 Defendants argued that the state actions for
damages asserted by Plaintiffs were preemptedby a suspended federal regulation.
The federal district court accepted defendants' argument and granted their
motions for summary judgment. 3 ' The Eleventh Circuit, which consolidated
the two cases, reversed," 2 holding that "the state-law tort claims were not
expressly pre-empted... and reject[ing] [Defendants'] alternative argument that
the claims were pre-empted due to a conflict between state law and the federal
regulatory scheme."'33 The Supreme Court affirmed, and what d'ya think, it
required only one opinion.'34
First, the Court rejected Defendants' argument that, "[d]espite the fact that
Standard 121 remains suspended, [the plaintiffs'] lawsuits are expressly pre-
empted."'" The Safety Act's express preemption provision read as follows:
Whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard established under
this subchapter is in effect, no State or political subdivision of a State
shall have any authority either to establish, or to continue in effect, with
respect to any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment, any
safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of such
vehicle or item of equipment which is not identical to the Federal
standard. Nothing in this section shall be construed as preventing any
State from enforcing any safety standard which is identical to a Federal
safety standard.
36
And, as noted by the Court, "[tlhe Act also contains a savings clause, which
states: 'Compliance with any Federal motor vehicle safety standard issued under
this subchapter does not exempt any person from any liability under common
law.""" It would seem to follow, a fortiori, that a standard not in effect
would not expressly preempt state common law damage actions.
128. Paccar, Inc. v. NHTSA, 573 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 862, 99 S.
Ct. 184 (1978).
129. Freightliner Corp., 115 S. Ct. at 1486.
130. Id.
131. Myrick v. Freuhauf Corp., 795 F. Supp. 1139 (N.D. Ga. 1992).
132. Myrick v. Freuhauf Corp., 13 F.3d 1516 (11 th Cir. 1994).
133. Id. at 1520.
134. Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 115 S. CL 1483, 1485 (1995).
135. Freightliner Corp., 115 S. Ct. at 1487 (emphasis added).
136. 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (1994) (repealed 1994 and superseded by 49 U.S.C. § 30103 (1994))
(emphasis added).
137. Freightliner Corp., 115 S. Ct. at 1486 (emphasis added); 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k) (1994)
(repealed 1994 and superseded by 49 U.S.C. § 30103(e) (1994)) (emphasis added).
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Defendants, however, argued that "the absence of regulation itself constitutes
regulation."' 38 Justice Thomas, finding that the lack of regulation in the cases
before the Court was not the product of any affirmative decision of agency
officials "to refrain from regulating air brakes[,]" 9 but rather a result of the
"decision of a federal court""' 0 suspending the regulation, concluded that the
absence of regulation did not constitute regulation.
Failing in their efforts to secure a ruling of express preemption, Defendants
sought to persuade the Court that Plaintiffs' "lawsuits are pre-empted by
implication because the state-law principle they seek to vindicate would conflict
with federal law."' 41 Justice Thomas wrote, "[w]e have recognized that a
federal statute implicitly overrides state law either when the scope of a statute
indicates that Congress intended federal law to occupy a field exclusively ... or
when state law is in actual conflict with federal law."" 2 But how can a federal
statute containing an express preemption provision have the effect of implicitly
preempting state common law beyond the express preemption, especially a
federal statute complemented by a "savings clause" providing that compliance
with the federal law does not exempt anyone from any liability under common
law?
The Court addressed that very problem, noting that, according to Plaintiffs
(and the Eleventh Circuit), "implied pre-emption cannot exist when Congress has
chosen to include an express pre-emption clause in a statute.""' 3 But the Court
found that "this argument is without merit."'" How can that be?
Quoting from Cipollone, the Court noted that, "Congress' enactment of a
provision defining the pre-emption reach of a statute implies that matters beyond
that reach are not pre-empted.""' Seizing on the word "implies" in that
excerpt, the Court concluded that "the fact that an express definition of the pre-
emptive reach of a statute 'implies'-i.e. supports a reasonable inference-that
Congress did not intend to pre-empt other matters does not mean that the express
clause entirely forecloses any possibility of implied pre-emption.' 46  To
corroborate that conclusion, the Court noted:
Indeed, just two paragraphs after the quoted passage in Cipollone, we
engaged in a conflict pre-emption analysis of the Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act ... and found "no general, inherent
138. Freightliner Corp., 115 S. CL at 1487.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. (emphasis added).
142. Id.
143. Freightliner Corp., 115 S. CL at 1487.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1488 (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517, 112 S. Ct. 2608,
2618 (1992)).
146. Id. at 1488.
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conflict between federal pre-emption of state warning requirements and
the continued vitality of state common law damages actions."'47
Consequently, the Court concluded that, "[alt best, Cipollone supports an
inference that an express pre-emption clause forecloses implied pre-emption; it
does not establish a rule." '' Ultimately, however, the Court found that the
defendants' implied preemption argument was "futile"' 4 because the plaintiffs'
common law actions for damages did not conflict with federal law.
What's going on here? In Cipollone, the Court, confronted with two express
preemption provisions and the question of whether either preempted any of the
plaintiff s state law actions for money damages, generated four different opinions
and was unable to produce a majority opinion with regard to the second
preemption provision. In Medtronic, the Court, confronted with one express
preemption provision and the question of whether it preempted any of the
plaintiffs' state law actions for money damages, once again generated four
different opinions. And in Freightliner, confronted with a judicially-suspended
federal safety standard, one express preemption provision complemented by a
savings clause, and the question of whether any of the plaintiffs' state law
actions for damages were preempted, the Court, although able to dispose of the
issue with one opinion, devoted a significant portion of that opinion to preserving
the Court's prerogative of finding an implied preemption beyond the congressio-
nally-enacted express preemption. All of this leads me to conclude that perhaps
several things are going on.
For one, Congress seems to have been guilty of using language with
sufficient ambiguity to compel or at least invite the Court to make the ultimate
determination of the scope of preemption intended. I have heard, as have others
I'm sure, that legislative bodies including Congress sometimes intentionally
utilize ambiguity as a means of mustering sufficient votes to pass a bill. It's a
sort of compromise by ambiguity. A legislator may be induced to vote for a bill,
some earlier provisions of which may have been offensive to him, if those
provisions, though not deleted, are made sufficiently ambiguous to invite a
judicial interpretation that may be tolerable to the legislator. In addition, and
rather closely related, a legislator unwilling or at least reluctant to support a bill
for fear of offending a valued portion of the electorate or a valued political
contributor may be induced to vote for the bill if the language likely to offend
is sufficiently amended to become ambiguous enough to compel judicial
interpretation. This diminishes the concerns of the interested electorate or the
interested contributor, and, not just incidentally, provides the legislator, in the
event of a "disappointing" judicial interpretation, the opportunity to express
shock or surprise to the interested electorate or contributor. Thus, for example,
147. Id. (quoting Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 518, 112 S. CL at 2618).
148. Frelghtliner Corp., 115 S. Ct. at 1488.
149. Id.
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a legislator-or several legislators-confronted with a bill regulating cigarette
warnings and advertisements may well be concerned about an adverse reaction
from those interested in protecting public health if the bill isn't "strong" enough,
and, at the same time, be concerned about an adverse reaction from those
engaged in the tobacco industry if the bill is too "strong." The solution?
Ambiguity. Use language regulating warnings and advertising and additional
language affording preemption of some state law, but language sufficiently
ambiguous to leave the scope of preemption not entirely clear. And, presto, the
bill passes and, ultimately, it will be unelected life-tenured federal judges,
including the Members of the Supreme Court, who are required to spell out the
scope of preemption.
For another thing, the Supreme Court has displayed what might be
characterized as an unseemly willingness, or even eagerness, to perform that
function. In Cipollone, Justice Stevens was willing to have his opinion
bifurcated into majority and plurality portions for the sake of preserving the
plurality view that the 1969 Act preempted the plaintiff's "claims based on a
failure to warn and the neutralization of federally mandated warnings to the
extent that those claims rely on omissions or inclusions in [the Defendants']
advertising or promotions. . . .""' And once again in Medtronic, Justice
Stevens was willing to present a bifurcated opinion for the sake of preserving the
plurality view that the MDA could preempt some common law actions, even
though it preempted none of the actions actually asserted by the plaintiffs. In
Freightliner, although only one opinion was generated, and that opinion found
no preemption of any of the claims asserted, Justice Thomas saw fit to devote
a significant portion of that opinion to preserving the Court's capacity to find an
implied preemption beyond the express preemption enacted by Congress.
Apparently, the Court, or at least a significant number of its Members, relishes
the opportunity of being the final arbiter of the scope of preemption, implied or
otherwise, even in the face of an express preemption provision enacted by
Congress.
Do I think Congress and the Court are engaged in a conspiracy? Of course
not. I'm not inclined to see a conspirator behind every tree or to credit those
who do. However, I do think Congress' intentional or inadvertent ambiguity, to
the extent that it exists, is unfortunate. I know that legislative compromise is the
lubricant of a democratic society, but I don't think ambiguity is an appropriate
means of effecting compromise. In the more common (and, to me, acceptable)
form of congressional compromise, members of both Houses may engage in a
significant give-and-take effort to secure passage of a bill. That kind of
compromise truly serves a democratic society, in a couple of ways. First, it
secures passage of a bill perceived to be desirable. Second, it will usually be
feasible for the electorate to determine which representatives and senators gave
and which took and what it was they gave or took, thereby permitting an.
150. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 530-31, 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2625 (1992).
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informed decision about those legislators at the next election. On the other hand,
compromise by ambiguity is much less likely to serve that second end.
Moreover, ambiguity as to a preemption provision assures that the critical
decision as to which, if any, state law actions for damages were intended to be
preempted will be made by a court rather than Congress and, in all likelihood,
ultimately by the Supreme Court. In addition to willingness, perhaps even
eagerness, to perform that function, the Court has displayed a marked inability
to perform the function in any given case with unanimity or clarity. The "crazy
quilt,""' "hodge-podge""' results achieved by the Court are indeed likely to
"fill the law-books for years to come.""' "A disposition that raises more
questions than it answers does not serve the country well.""
Even a cursory reading of the three cases considered herein suggests the
tortuous path imposed on injured litigants seeking compensatory damages and the
defendants from whom such damages are sought, a path fashioned by legislative
ambiguities and judicial interpretation, the latter seeming at times to be more a
reflection of individual preferences of Members of the Court than of congressio-
nal intent. In Cipollone, the federal district court found that the express
preemption provisions in the 1965 and 1969 Acts were not intended to preempt
any common law actions. The Third Circuit reversed. And, in turn, the
Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, producing four separate
opinions. In Medtronic, the federal district court (influenced by an Eleventh
Circuit opinion) found that the MDA preemption provision had been intended to
preempt all of the plaintiffs' state law actions. The Eleventh Circuit reversed in
part and affirmed in part. In turn, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and
reversed in part, once again generating four opinions. Finally, in Freightliner,
the federal district court granted defendants' motions for summary judgment on
the basis of a judicially suspended federal regulation. The Eleventh Circuit
reversed. This time the Supreme Court affirmed and required only one opinion
to do so. But a significant portion of that opinion was directed toward
preserving the Court's capacity to find an implied preemption beyond an express
preemption provision, thus virtually assuring repeat performances of the kind
manifested in Cipollone and Medtronic.'"
151. Id. at 542, 112 S. Ct. at 2631.
152. Id. at 543, 112 S. Ct. at 2631.
153. Id. at 556, 112 S. Ct. at 2638.
154. Id.
155. The three cases examined herein are not unique in suggesting a lack of certainty on the part
of the Court. In American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 115 S. Ct. 817 (1995), Plaintiffs sued Defendant
airline seeking injunctive relief and damages under Illinois common law and Illinois statutory law,
the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 505/2
(1992) (formerly codified at Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 121%, 262 (1991), because of Defendant's
retroactive changes in the benefits available to members of the airline's frequent flyers club.
Defendant argued that both common law and statutory theories and both the injunctive relief and
damages sought were preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA), 92 Stat. 1705 and its
preemption clause:
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[N]o State ... shall enact or enforce any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other
provision having the force and effect of law relating to rates, routes, or services of any
air carrier...
49 U.S.C. App. § 1305(aXl). See American Airlines, 115 S. Ct. at 821.
After the Supreme Court of Illinois denied the injunctive relief sought, finding it preempted, but
permitted both the common law and statutory actions for damages, finding them not preempted, 157
111.2d 466 (1993). the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari, 114 S. CL 1396 (1994).
Justice Ginsburg wrote the Court's opinion in which it was concluded that the common law action
for damages was not preempted but that the statutory action for damages was preempted. "The
middle course we adopt seems to us best calculated to carry out the congressional design; it also
bears the approval of the statute's experienced administrator, the [Department of Transportation]."
American Airlines, 115 S. Ct. at 827 (emphasis added). The italicized language implies to me more
judicial preference than congressional intent.
Justice Stevens wrote a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part. Id. at 827. He
wrote, "[iln my opinion, private tort actions based on common law negligence or fraud, or on a
statutory prohibition against fraud, are not pre-empted." Id.
Justice O'Connor, too, wrote a separate opinion, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part. Id. at 828. Justice Thomas joined in all but one section of that opinion. Justice O'Connor
wrote:
In permitting [the Plaintiffs') contract action to go forward, the Court arrives at what
might be a reasonable policy judgment as to when state law actions against airlines should
be preempted if we were free to legislate it. It is not, however, consistent with our
controlling precedents, and it requires some questionable assumptions about the nature of
contract law. I would hold that none of [the Plaintiffs'] actions may proceed.
Id. (emphasis added). The italicized language suggests a conclusion by a Member of the Court that
some of her colleagues may have lapsed from determining congressional intent to asserting judicial
preference. Justice Scalia took no part in the consideration or decision in Wolens. Id. at 827.
In Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 112 S. Ct. 2031 (1992), the same
preemption clause involved in Wolens was at issue. The National Association of Attorneys General
(NAAG) adopted guidelines "governing the content and format of airline advertising, the awarding
of premiums to regular customers (so-called 'frequent flyers'), and the payment of compensation to
passengers who voluntarily yield their seats on overbooked flights." Id. at 379, 112 S. Ct. at 2034.
The guidelines were based on existing state laws. The guidelines were sent to major airlines along
with a memorandum warning that noncompliance with the guidelines would lead to "enforcement
actions." Id. at 379, 112 S. Ct. at 2035. The airlines, "claiming that state regulation of fare
advertisement [was] preempted by § 1305(aXl)[,] [sought] a declaratory judgment... and ... an
injunction restraining ... any action under ... the guidelines." Id. at 380, 112 S. Ct. at 2035. The
federal district court, "in an unreported order," id., granted the injunction, and the Fifth Circuit
affirmed. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Morales, 949 F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1991).
With regard to all "the fare advertising provisions of the NAAG guidelines," the Supreme Court
affirmed by majority opinion, finding those provisions to be preempted by the preemption clause.
Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 391, 112 S. Ct. 2031, 2041 (1992). Justice
Scalia wrote the majority opinion, in which Justices White, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas joined.
Id. Justice Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion, concluding that the preemption provision preempted
only those state laws relating "directly to rates, routes, or services." Id. at 421, 112 S. Ct. at 2055.
It did not preempt "every traditional state regulation that might have some indirect connection with,
or relationship to, airline rates, routes, or services. . ." Id. at 421, 112 S. Ct. at 2055-56. Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Blackmun joined in that dissenting opinion. Id. at 375, 112 S. Ct. at
2033. Justice Souter took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Id.
Wolens and Morales rather dramatically demonstrate the disparity of views among the Members
of the Court, since the Court divided in both cases despite the fact that both dealt with the same
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Can anything be done to achieve an acceptable level of certainty with regard
to so basic a question as whether an express preemption provision preempts state
law actions for damages, a level of certainty that will permit litigants or would-
be litigants and lower courts to make intelligent, informed decisions with regard
to that basic question? I think the answer is "yes," and I believe the solution is
an easy one; at least, easy to propose. Whether Congress and the Court will find
it sufficiently tolerable to accept depends, I think, on the former's willingness to
forsake compromise by ambiguity and the latter's willingness to surrender this
question of congressional intent to Congress. Let's suggest to Congress and the
Court that an express preemption provision will not be deemed to preempt state
law actions for damages unless the following (or equivalent) language appears
in the provision:
Any state law action for damages arising out of the design, manufacture,
labeling, marketing, sale, or use of such a product or device, or the
provision of such service is preempted.
That should eliminate the problem of legislative ambiguity, whether intentional
or inadvertent. It should also eliminate the problem of divergent views among
Members of the Court as to whether an express preemption provision preempts
state law actions for damages. And let's fashion this corollary to the basic
proposal: If the express preemption provision does not cbntain the proposed
language (or its equivalent), the Court should not find such a preemption to have
been intended impliedly either on the basis of a conflict between federal and state
law or on the basis that the federal law has occupied the field. There are two
rationales for this corollary. First, it seems necessary to achieve the certainty
desired, given the Court's propensity to preserve its power to find an implied
preemption even beyond the terms of an express preemption. Second, this
corollary assumes the legislative competence of Congress: if the congressionally
enacted express preemption provision does not include the proposed language,
Congress does not intend a preemption of state law actions for damages,
notwithstanding any judicial determination of "conflict" or "occupation."
Obviously, the proposal and its corollary should be deemed applicable to
federal statutes enacted in the future and containing express preemption
provisions. In those circumstances, the proposal and its corollary would be
applicable both to Congress in the enactment process and to the Court in the
interpretation process. In addition, the proposal and its corollary should be
deemed applicable to federal statutes containing express preemption provisions
already enacted but not yet interpreted by the Court. In those circumstances, the
proposal and its corollary would be applicable to the Court and its process of
interpretation.
express preemption provision. Apparently, the Members have had little success in persuading each
other.
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How about the three statutes involved in the cases considered herein: Should
the proposal and its corollary be considered applicable to them, notwithstanding
the Court's completed interpretation? I think the answer may be yes. In
Cipollone, the majority opinion concluded that the 1965 Act preempted none of
the plaintiff's claims. The proposal and its corollary would produce the same
result but with a different rationale in a future case addressing the preemptive
scope of the Act, thus creating no serious disparity in result. The minority
opinion concluded that the 1969 Act did preempt a portion of the plaintiff's
claims, but that was only a plurality opinion. Application of the proposal and
its corollary would produce a contrary result-no preemption-but one that
would disturb no opinion of the Court. In Medtronic, the majority opinion
concluded that the MDA preempted none of the plaintiffs' claims. The proposal
and its corollary would produce the same result but with a different rationale,
thus once again creating no serious disparity in result. The plurality opinion
found that the MDA could preempt certain claims but left those claims
unidentified. The proposal and its corollary would produce a different result-no
preemption-but again one that would disturb no opinion of the Court. In
Freightliner, the Court's opinion concluded that the suspended standard
preempted none of the plaintiffs' claims but preserved the Court's right to find
an implied preemption beyond the terms of an express statutory preemption.
The proposal and its corollary would produce the same result-no preemp-
tion-but would eliminate the Court's capacity to find an implied preemption
beyond an express preemption provision. While that would eliminate the dictum
in Freightliner, it would do so for the purpose of preserving the intention and
competence of Congress and precluding that intent from being overridden by
judicial preference. That, of course, goes to the core purpose of the proposal and
its corollary. That simple proposal and its corollary should eliminate from the
resolution of the basic issue considered any trepidation on the part of litigants
and courts akin to the prospect of being skinned by a cardsharp or of suffering
a split head inflicted by an ardent barroom brawler. I think even Zayde would
approve.
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